成功躲避三次金融危机的格兰瑟姆再度“看空”未来：一切的一切都是不确定的

　　编译 |?林伟萍

　　——编者按——

　　美东时间6月11日，不断创新高的美股遭遇“黑色星期四”，美股三大股指均以暴跌收盘，道指大跌1861.82点。而这正切合被市场誉为“永远的空头、GMO长期投资策略师及公司联合创始人杰里米·格兰瑟姆(Jeremy Grantham)对市场发出的预警：“目前的市场似乎已迷失于片面乐观之中，但谨慎和耐心似乎更合适。”

　　按照资管“先知”GMO公司的传统，6月4日，公司如期对外发布2020年一季度给投资人的季度信(《1Q 2020 GMO Quarterly Letter》)。在该信件中，作为曾准确预测1989年的日本股市崩盘以及2000年的美国“科技泡沫”和2008年的美国和欧洲的金融危机的传奇投资人，格兰瑟姆在信中坦言：他今年一月份就感觉到情况不妙。在他看来，此次危机，没有确定性可谈；到年底，成千上万的公司将会面临债务存量不断增加至顶峰的情况；几乎可以肯定的是，V型复苏看起来希望渺茫。

　　为了让《红周刊》的读者原汁原味的理解和体会格兰瑟姆对市场的真知灼见，我们特意为读者准备了英文原版以及中文精译双语版本，以下为格兰瑟姆信件的精彩观点和完整版文章。

　　精彩观点：

　　一切都是不确定的，也许是前所未有的程度。

　　疫情给供需带来的冲击正在以远快于大萧条的速度，引发经济萎缩。

　　我们真的不知道需要多长时间全球经济才能复苏。几乎可以肯定的是，V型复苏看起来希望渺茫。

　　企业破产已经开始了，到年底，成千上万的公司将会面临债务存量不断增加至顶峰的情况。

　　美国股市当前的市盈率处于历史前10%的水平。相比之下，美国经济则处于最糟糕的10%，甚至可能是1%。

　　超额的刺激资金最终会流入股市，但不一定会让人们重返工作岗位。至少在一段时间内，失业率将高达20%。

　　就风险和回报来说——尤其是最糟糕的结果和最好的结果相比，目前的市场似乎已迷失于片面乐观之中，但谨慎和耐心似乎更合适。

　　以下为信件全文：

　　THE VIRUS, ?THE ECONOMY,?AND THE MARKET

　　病毒、经济和市场

　　Jeremy Grantham

　　杰里米·格兰瑟姆

　　My simple life at GMO of focusing most of my efforts on climate change related investing was rudely interrupted by the coronavirus. The virus is a bottomless pit of complexity, contradictory data, and guesswork.

　　我在GMO公司将精力主要集中在与气候变化相关的投资上，但这种简单的生活被新冠病毒粗暴地打断了。疫情之中，事态纷繁复杂，互相矛盾的数据迭出，人们只能不断诉诸猜测，犹如无底之洞。

　　The interactions of the virus with the economy and new economic measures are the same: complex and without precedent.

　　疫情与经济运行及新经济措施的相互作用也经历着相同的状况：复杂且史无前例。

　　And the interactions with the market psychology of these medical, financial, economic, and political actions, well, as any self-respecting gangster would say, “Fuhgeddaboudit.” So, starting in late January – yes, I was way ahead of the U.S. and the U.K. administrations, both spectacularly slow to get the point – I have been spending twice my usual total research time on all these new interactions, which for anyone interested in data analysis have presented an amazing challenge. The goodnews is the days flash by. The bad news is that new data arrives faster than humans can keep up with.

　　而至于医疗、金融、经济和政治行动与市场心理的相互作用，借用一句知道自重的歹徒会说的——“完全没可能”。美英两国政府长时间搞不清楚状况，而我一月下旬就有预感情况不妙。因此，从那时开始，我便一直研究这些新的相互作用，投入的时间相当于我平时研究时间的两倍。对于任何对数据分析感兴趣的人来说，这些新的现象都是一个巨大但令人惊喜的挑战。好消息是日子过得很快。坏消息是人类分析的速度跟不上新数据产生的速度。

　　For now, let’s get this on the table.

　　现在，让我们把这个摆到桌面上来谈。

　　There are no certainties here. At GMO we dealt with three major events prior to this crisis, and rightly or wrongly, we felt “nearly certain” that sooner or later we would ??be right. We exited Japan 100% in 1987 at 45x and watched it go to 65x (for a second, bigger than the U.S.) before a downward readjustment of 30 years and counting.

　　此次危机，没有确定性可谈。在此之前，GMO公司曾渡过三大关，而且我们当时都“几乎肯定”迟早会是正确的，尽管如今来看，当时判断并非准确。1987年，我们在股指45倍市盈率的时候，将资金全部(100%)从日本市场撤出，然后看着它的市盈率继续上涨到65倍(有那么一小段时间，日本股市估值比美国还高)，但之后日本股市开始了长达30年的向下调整，目前还在继续。

　　In early 1998 we fought the Tech bubble from 21x (equal to the previous record high?in 1929) to 35x before a 50% decline, losing many clients and then regaining even more on the round trip. In 2007 we led our clients relatively painlessly through the housing bust. In all three we felt we were nearly certain to be right. Japan, the Tech bubbles, and 1929, which sadly I missed, were not new types of events. They were merely extreme cases akin to South Sea Bubble investor euphoria and madness.

　　1988年初，我们与“科技泡沫”搏斗，此时科技股市盈率从21倍(相当于此前于1929年创下的历史高点)走向35倍，随后大跌50%。在这个过程中，我们失去了很多客户，同时，在市场触底折返的过程中，我们获得了更多客户。而2007年，我们带领着客户，以较少的损失度过了房地产泡沫破裂的过程。在这三件事情上的判断，我们几乎肯定自己是对的。日本、科技泡沫，以及我遗憾错过的1929年，这些都不是新事物，只不过是与南海泡沫事件中投资者兴奋和疯狂相类似的极端事例。

　　The 2008 event also was easier if you focused on the U.S. housing euphoria, which was a 3-sigma, 100-year event or, simply, unique. We calculated that a return trip to the old price trend and a typical overrun in those extreme house prices would remove?$10 trillion of perceived wealth from U.S. consumers and guarantee the worst recession for decades.

　　如果你看到了美国房市的狂欢，会更容易理解2008年的事件(次贷危机)的原因，这是一个三西格玛、百年一遇——或者简言之——独一无二的事件。根据我们当时的测算，如果房价回到原来的趋势，再加上极端的房价出现典型的过度上涨，美国消费者的预期财富将减少10万亿美元，并注定会出现数十年来最严重的衰退。

　　All these events echoed historical precedents. And from these precedents we drew confidence.

　　所有这些事件都是历史先例的重演。从这些历史事件中，我们获得了信心。

　　But this event is unlike all those. It is totally new and there can be no near certainties, merely strong possibilities. This is why Ben Inker, our Head of Asset Allocation, is nervous and this is why you are nervous, or should be.

　　但这次新冠疫情事件不同于所有这些先例。它是全新的，并且几乎找不到任何确定性，只有可能性。这就是我们的资产配置主管本·印克(Ben Inker)紧张的原因，也是你们紧张的原因，或者说应该紧张的原因。

　　Everyone can see and feel that this is different and can sense the bizarre nature of the market response: we are in the top 10% of historical price earnings ratio for the S&P on prior earnings and simultaneously are in the worst 10% of economic situations, arguably even the worst 1%!

　　每个人都能看到并感觉到这次不一样，也能感觉到市场反应的异乎寻常：按照标普以往的收益计算，我们处于历史市盈率的前10%，同时我们也处于经济形势中最糟糕的10%，甚至可以说是最糟糕的1%！

　　And worse, we had U.S. and global problems looming before the virus: an increasingly disturbed climate causing global floods, droughts, and farming problems; slowing population growth, in the developed world, soon to be negative; and steadily slowing productivity gains, especially in the developed world, and therefore a slowing GDP trend. In the U.S., our 3%+ a year trend is down to, at best, 1.5% in my opinion. It is closer to a 1% maximum in Europe.

　　更糟糕的是，在病毒出现之前，美国及全球性问题就已经浮现：日益受扰动的气候导致全球洪水、干旱和农业问题；在发达国家，人口增长放缓，而且很快就会出现负增长；生产率增长持续放缓，特别是在发达国家，因此GDP增长也呈放缓趋势。在我看来，美国经济的年增长趋势已经从3%多的降至最多1.5%。而在欧洲，1%的增速似乎就是经济增长的上限了。

　　We had, as mentioned, top 10% historical P/Esin the U.S. and much the highest debt level ever in the U.S. for both corporations and peacetime government. So, after a 10-year economic recovery, this would have been a perfectly normal time historically for a setback.

　　如前所述，美国股市市盈率达到了史上前10%的高位，企业和和平时期政府的债务水平也达到了建国以来最高水平。因此，在经历了十年的经济复苏之后，此时经济出现衰退历史上看似乎再合适不过了。

　　And then the virus hit.

　　然后病毒就来了

　　Simultaneously, it is causing supply and demand shocks unlike anything before. Ever. It is generating a much faster economic contraction than that of the Great Depression. And unlike 1989 Japan, 2000 Tech (U.S.), and 2008 (U.S. and Europe), it is truly global. The drop in GDP and rise in unemployment in four weeks have equaled what took one to four years to reach in the Great Depression and were never reached in the other events.

　　与此同时，疫情给供需带来的冲击之大前所未见。而且，它正在以远快于大萧条的速度，引发经济萎缩。1989年的日本股市崩盘、2000年的美国“科技泡沫”和2008年的美国和欧洲的金融危机都还算是区域层面的危机，而这次不同，这次是真正的全球性危机。四周之内GDP下降的幅度、失业率上升的幅度，相当于大萧条时期一至四年才能达到的水平，而在上述其他事件中情况从未变得如此严重。

　　Rogoff & Reinhart, Harvard Professors who wrote the definitive analysis of the 2008 bust, agree that this event is indeed completely different and suggest it will take at least 5 years to regain 2019 levels of activity. But this is a guess. We really don’t know how long it will take. Nearly certain is that a V-shaped recovery looks like a lost hope. The best possible outcome would be that there will be, almost miraculously, billions of doses of effective vaccine by year-end.

　　撰写了对2008年泡沫破裂权威分析的哈佛大学教授罗格夫和莱因哈特，也赞同此次危机与以往完全不同的观点，并认为至少需要5年时间才能恢复到2019年的经济活动水平。但这只是个猜测。我们真的不知道需要多长时间全球经济才能复苏。几乎可以肯定的是，V型复苏看起来希望渺茫。最好的结果可能是，到年底的时候，奇迹般地出现数十亿剂有效疫苗。

　　But most viruses have never had a useful vaccine and most useful vaccines have taken well over five years to develop and when developed have been only partially successful. Yes, this time there will be an enormous effort with unprecedented spending. But still, a leading vaccine expert says quick success would be like “drawing successfully to several inside straights in a row.”And even if all works out well with a vaccine there will remain deep economic wounds.

　　但是，大多数病毒从未有过有用的疫苗，而且大多数有用的疫苗需要远超五年的时间才能研制出来，而即使研制成功，也只是部分成功。的确，针对新冠病毒，全世界都在夜以继日的研发疫苗，其耗费的资金将前所未见。但是，一位顶级的疫苗专家说，快速成功就像“连续几次成功搏到顺子中间缺的牌”。而且，即使疫苗的进展顺利，也会留下严重的经济创伤。

　　Bankruptcies have already started (Hertz on May 22nd) and by year-end thousands of them will arrive into a peak of already existing corporate debt. It will need spectacular management, which it may get. But it may not. Throwing money – paper and electronic impulses – at the problem can help psychology and, particularly, the stock market, where extra stimulus money can end up but does not necessarily put people back to work; there will be up to 20% unemployment for at least a moment.

　　企业破产已经开始了(美国赫兹公司5月22日破产了)，到年底，成千上万的公司将会面临债务存量不断增加至顶峰的情况。这样的债务规模将会需要惊人的管理能力——可能会得到，也可能不会。通过加印纸质钞票和电子货币，去解决这个问题，会支撑市场心理，尤其是支撑股市。超额的刺激资金最终会流入股市，但不一定会让人们重返工作岗位。至少在一段时间内，失业率将高达20%。

　　Sound and massive infrastructure spending would address the problem better, including greening both the grid and energy production. At least the size and speed of the initial financial help, which fortunately we learned to do in the housing financial bust, has saved us from the certainty of Great Depression II. But this is only round one. And many global administrations are, shall we say, not consistently sensible.

　　解决这个(失业)问题，更好的方案是进行大规模，但合理的基础设施投资，包括电网的绿色改造和增加可再生能源的生产。至少，疫情之初，财政救援的规模之大和速度之快，让我们避免了一场大萧条2.0。万幸，我们在房地产金融泡沫破灭时学到了这招。但这只是第一轮。我们可以这样说，许多国家的政府的决策并不是一贯明智的。

　　Unanticipatable outcomes seem to be guaranteed. We will all have had an enforced several months of introspection. This could turn out to be a fulcrum, or tipping point, for new social and business trends: deficiencies in capitalism; inequality; climate change and our environment: limited resources in a finite world; our current high consumption economy; growth at any price.Attitudes to several of these factors were already beginning to shift before the virus. Resistance to the downsides of the status quo was already stirring. Now, all may be up for grabs.

　　似乎可以肯定的是，结果无法预测。我们将有几个月在家隔离的时间可以自我反省。本次危机还可能撬动或者引爆新的社会和商业趋势：资本主义的缺陷；不平等；气候变化与我们的环境：有限世界中的有限资源；我们目前的高消费经济；不计代价的经济增长。疫情爆发之前，人们对其中几个因素的态度已经开始转变，对现状不利因素的抵触情绪已经在发酵。现在，所有这些都是可能争取到的。

　　In short, we have never lived in a period where the future was so uncertain. Yet the market is 10% below its previous high in January when, superficially at least,?everything seemed fine in economics and finance. And if not “fine,” well, good enough.

　　简而言之，我们从未经历过未来如此不确定的时期。不过，目前的股市比1月份的高点低了10%，当时，至少从表面上看，经济和金融领域似乎一切正常。就算不是“很好”，也已经足够好了。

　　The future paths include many that could change corporate profitability, growth, and many aspects of capitalism, society, and the global political scene. Some perhaps for ???the better, but some not. The key here is uncertainty, which in some ways seems the highest in my experience. So, in terms of risk and return – particularly of the worst possible outcomes compared to the best – the current market seems lost in one-sided optimism when prudence and patience seem much more appropriate.

　　未来许多计划都可能改变企业的盈利能力、企业的增长以及资本主义、社会和全球政治格局的许多方面。有些可能是向着较好方向转变，但有些不是。问题的关键在于不确定性。从某些方面来说，这次危机似乎是我经历过的最大的不确定性。因此，就风险和回报来说——尤其是最糟糕的结果和最好的结果相比，目前的市场似乎已迷失于片面乐观之中，但谨慎和耐心似乎更合适。

　　Summary

　　总结

　　The few-line summary of my argument is this: the current P/E ?on the U.S. market is ??in the top 10% of its history. The U.S. economy in contrast is in its worst 10%, perhaps even the worst 1%. In addition, everything is uncertain, perhaps to a unique degree. The market’s P/E level typically reflects current conditions (please see Appendix).

　　我对自己观点的简短总结是：美国股市当前的市盈率处于历史前10%的水平。相比之下，美国经济则处于最糟糕的10%，甚至可能是1%。此外，一切都是不确定的，也许是前所未有的程度。市场的市盈率水平通常反映了当前的状况。

　　Markets have historically loved fat margins, low inflation, stability and, by inference, low levels of uncertainty. This is apparently one of the most impressive mismatches in history. That being said, this is a new type of crisis and much will be different. There are no certainties but there are probably still some better and safer themes. Caution and patience are likely to be two of them.

　　市场历来喜欢丰厚的利润率、低通胀、稳定以及由此推断的低不确定性。这次危机显然是历史上令人印象最深刻的错配之一。话虽如此，这是一种新型的危机，将会有很大的不同。虽然没有定论，但可能还有一些更好、更安全的主题。谨慎和耐心可能是其中之二。

　　(文章信息来源：GMO官网)